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Rotenberg: ERISA - Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.: The Third Circuit S
1997]
ERISA-FISCHER v. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO.: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT "SERIOUSLY CONSIDERS" THE FIDUCIARY
DUTY TO DISCLOSE POTENTIAL CHANGES
TO AN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN
UNDER ERISA

I.

INTRODUCTION

The employer that administers its employees' benefit plan or manages the assets of such a plan triggers fiduciary obligations for itself under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").I This
employer owes a duty to deal fairly and honestly with plan participants and
must "discharge [its] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interests of
the plan participants and beneficiaries. " 2 Suppose that while administering the plan, the employer decides to increase the pension benefits that it
provides to its employees upon retirement. 3 This employer risks becoming the defendant in lawsuits filed by former employees who retired while
the employer was deliberating over the possible increase. 4 The disgruntled retirees may claim that the employer breached its fiduciary disclosure
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The term "fiduciary"
is defined in § 1002(21)(A):
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1994). For a discussion of the conferral of fiduciary status under ERISA, see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). For the express language of § 1104(a), see infra note
29. For a discussion of the general scope of the ERISA fiduciary duties, see infra
notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
3. See Donald P. Carleen, Duty to Disclose Serious Consideration of Plan Changes,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 1996, at 3 (providing hypothetical upon which textual scenario is
based).
4. See id. (describing, in context of hypothetical, situation in which employer
becomes defendant in lawsuits filed by former employees who retired while employer was considering potential plan amendments); see also Kurz v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Kurz 1] (involving plaintiffs
who retired before adoption of plan change but during period in which employer
contemplated plan change); Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 132
(3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Fischer1] (same).

(1915)
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obligations under ERISA, asserting that they would not have retired had
5
they known the employer was considering the plan change.

Nevertheless, the employer may seek to avoid disclosing its internal
deliberations regarding potential plan changes for several reasons. 6 For
example, the employer may not want to confuse its employees or create
false expectations by announcing potential plan changes that may never
be adopted. 7 Alternatively, the employer may be economically motivated
to avoid disclosure of its internal deliberations regarding potential plan
changes. 8 For instance, the employer knows that few employees would
elect to participate in a voluntary early retirement program if they discovered that the employer was considering the possibility of enhancing the
benefits due under the program in the near future. 9
In light of the foregoing and within the context of the existing climate of increased fiduciary litigation under ERISA, courts have had to examine whether and to what extent ERISA contemplates a fiduciary duty to
5. See Carleen, supra note 3, at 3 ("Some of these retirees claim that they did
not ask whether a plan amendment was under consideration but that the company
should have volunteered that fact. Other retirees claim that they did ask but that
the company refused to say ....
Still others claim that, when they asked, the
company lied .... ). In FischerI, one employee who retired less than two months
before the defendant employer "seriously considered" implementing a plan
change expressed his thoughts:
If I had only known of the retirement package I would have waited ....
[My family and] I had 41 years of dedicated services to [my employer].... I feel that we should have been told of the sweetener ....
I
feel hurt and deceived that I was not given the opportunity [to take advantage] of the early retirement package.
Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135.
6. See Carleen, supra note 3, at 3 (describing reasons for employers not to
disclose their internal deliberations regarding potential plan changes).
7. See id. (discussing negative effects of disclosing potential plan changes that
may never be adopted).
8. See id. (discussing economic reasons to avoid disclosure of internal deliberations regarding potential plan changes); see also Edward E. Bintz, FiduciaryResponsibility UnderERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciay Duty to Disclose?,54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 979,
997 (1993) ("A business that for competitive reasons finds it necessary to reduce its
workforce should not be prevented from pursuing a business plan under which an
initial early retirement or severance pay plan will be improved if a sufficient
number of employees do not elect to retire or terminate employment.").
9. See Carleen, supra note 3, at 3 (describing employers' motivations for not
disclosing their internal deliberations); see also Bintz, supra note 8, at 997 (observing that if affirmative duty were imposed upon employers to disclose proposed
plan changes, such plan changes would be impossible to implement). In one case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded, as a practical
matter, that compelled disclosure in this situation would "impair the achievement
of legitimate business goals" of the employer, such as making successively better
offers of early retirement incentives in an effort to cause a voluntary reduction in
force. Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 302 (1996). Likewise, the court noted that "[i]f fiduciaries were required to
disclose such a business strategy, it would necessarily fail. Employees simply would
not leave if they were informed that improved benefits were planned if workforce
reductions were insufficient." Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
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disclose information regarding potential plan changes to plan participants
and beneficiaries that supplements its express reporting and disclosure
rules.10 Although several courts of appeals have addressed this issue, few
have articulated an intelligible standard for determining whether a fiduciary duty to disclose will be imposed in such circumstances. Conversely, in

deciding Fischer v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co. ("Fischer F),II the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clearly imposed upon ERISA fiduciaries the duty to disclose plan changes that are under "serious consideration," but not yet adopted. 12 In Fischerv. PhiladelphiaElectric Co. ("Fischer
i/,),13 the same court embellished this standard, setting forth its "serious
consideration" formulation-a three-pronged test to determine whether
14
and when such serious consideration has arisen in a particular situation.
This Casebrief addresses the Third Circuit's "serious consideration"
formulation regarding the fiduciary duty to disclose potential changes to
an employee benefit plan under ERISA. 15 As background, Part II examines ERISA's regulatory scheme. 16 Part II also discusses the development
of the ERISA fiduciary duty to disclose, and in this regard explores the
fiduciary duty to disclose at common law, the interpretation of ERISA's
fiduciary duty to disclose in the federal courts of appeals and the evolution
of ERISA's fiduciary duty to disclose in the Third Circuit.1 7 Next, Part III
focuses on the Third Circuit's opinion in Fischer II, providing an in-depth
analysis of the "serious consideration" formulation. 18 Finally, Part IV considers some conclusions regarding the practical significance of the Fischer
1I holding. 19
10. See gererally, Bintz, supra note 8, at 979-1004 (providing thorough historical
analysis). For a discussion of the federal appellate courts' interpretations of ERISA's fiduciary duty to disclose regarding potential plan changes, see infra notes
40-74 and accompanying text.
11. 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1993).
12. Id. at 135. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in FischerI, see
infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
13. 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997) [hereinaf-

ter Fischer II].
14. Id. at 1538-43 (pronouncing and applying "serious consideration" formulation). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in FischerII, see infra notes
100-31 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's "serious consideration" formulation, see infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of ERISA's regulatory scheme, see infta notes 20-33 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty to disclose at common law, see infta
notes 34-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the federal appellate
courts' interpretations of the ERISA fiduciary duty to disclose, see infra notes 40-64
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the ERISA fiduciary duty to disclose in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 65-74 and accompanying
text.
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in FischerI see infra notes
75-131 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the practical application of the FischerII holding, see
infta notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
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ERISA

ERISA's Regulatry Scheme: Two Components of Conduct Regulation

ERISA is the vehicle through which Congress federalized the law governing privately sponsored employee benefit plans. 20 Congress enacted
ERISA with the dual purpose of protecting employees' rights to pension

and welfare benefits, and encouraging the development of the private
pension and welfare benefit system without placing excessive burdens on

it.2 1 To promote uniformity, ERISA preempts state regulation of em20. See HENRY H. PERRITV, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5.1 (1st ed. 1990) (discussing scope of ERISA). Since the enactment of ERISA,
Congress has extensively and repeatedly amended ERISA's pension regulatory regime to
(1) tailor the application of the termination insurance system to multiemployer plans; (2) promote gender equity by reducing age conditions on
plan participation and vesting and by restricting the application of break
in service rules; (3) increase protection for surviving and divorced
spouses; (4) greatly accelerate permissible vesting schedules; and (5)
strengthen the minimum funding standards and termination insurance
system applicable to defined benefits plans.
PeterJ. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies And "Plans,"72 WASH. U. L.Q.
559, 563-64 & nn.25-29 (1994) (citing relevant legislation).
ERISA's regulatory regime governs only certain employee benefit plans. See
id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994)). ERISA defines an employee benefit plan
as "'an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a
plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension
benefit plan."' Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994)). Under ERISA, a pension
plan is a program that "systematically defers cash compensation until termination of
employment (or longer)." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (A)). On the other
hand, a welfare plan is a program that "provides any of certain specifically-listed
benefits ... whether the benefit plan is provided on a current or deferred basis." Id.
at 564-65 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994)). Moreover, "[a] benefit arrangement must constitute a 'plan, fund, or program' to qualify as either a pension plan
or a welfare plan." Id. at 565 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1002(2)(A)). For a
discussion of how courts have struggled with the concept of a "plan," see
Wiedenbeck, supra, at 576-96.
21. See Steven Davi, Note, To Tell the Truth: An Analysis of Fiduciary Disclosure
Duties and Employee Standing to Assert Claims Under ERISA, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 625, 625-29 (1995) (exploring Congress's competing goals in enacting
ERISA). Congress's express purpose in enacting ERISA was
to protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect
thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (b).
Congress enacted ERISA after a decade of work on pension and employee
benefit issues. SeeJeffrey A. Brauch, The Dangerof IgnoringPlain Meaning: Individual
Relieffor Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under ERISA, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1233,' 1237 (1995)
(expounding upon ERISA's background and legislative history). In enacting ERISA, Congress responded to the phenomena that many employees who had been
promised pensions were not receiving them. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)).
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For example, the 1963 closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South Bend,
Indiana caused the termination of the company's pension plan, which covered
11,000 auto workers. See id. at 1238. One commentator noted that "the plan was
so seriously underfunded at termination that 4,000 employees between the ages of
forty and fifty-nine with at least ten years of service, and whose pensions had
vested, received only fifteen cents on the dollar of their accrued benefits." Id. As
such, several commentators view this incident as the "'pivotal event in the history
of the movement toward comprehensive federal regulation of private pension
plans.'" Id. at 1238 (quoting JOHN H. LANBEIN & BRUCE A. WoLK,PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFrr LAw 62 (2d ed. 1995)).
Congress blamed plan fiduciaries for the underfunding that resulted in the
failure of pension plans. See id. One commentator observed that "[ilt determined
that action was needed to prevent fiduciary self-dealing, misappropriation of plan
funds, and imprudent investing." Id.; see also 120 CONG. REc. 29,934 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) (stating that "absence of any supervision over these funds and
lack of minimum standards to safeguard the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries has led . . .to widespread complaints signaling the need for remedial
legislation."); 120 CONG. REc. 29,949-50 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (noting that
new law will prevent abuses due to underfunding by setting minimum standards);
120 CONG. REC. 29,957 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff) (observing that employers often manipulate pension funds or make bad investments). In fact, ERISA's
Findings and Declaration of Policy states that:
The Congress finds that.., many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing
to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits ....
Brauch, supra, at 1237-38 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)); see also 120 CONG. REC.
29,950 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) ("Government statistics indicate that during
1972 alone more than 15,000 pension plan participants lost retirement benefits
because their pension plan terminated with insufficient assets to meet all plan
obligations.").
Regarding Congress's goal of alleviating excessive burdens on the development of the private pension and welfare benefit system, one commentator observed that Congress had found that "plans and plan sponsors faced a maze of
different and often conflicting state laws and regulations that resulted in administrative inefficiencies and costs that ultimately hurt plan participants." Brauch,
supra, at 1238; see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,198 (statement of Rep. Ullman) (finding
that "these new requirements have been carefully designed to provide adequate
protection for employees and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting for the
growth and development of private pension plans"); 120 CONG. REc. 29,210 (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski) (expressing that "[t]he goal of this legislation was to
strengthen the rights of employees under existing pension systems, while at the
same time encouraging the expansion of these plans and the creating of new
ones"); 120 CONG. REc. 29,945 (statement of Sen. Long) (observing that "[w]e
know that new pension plans will not be adopted and that existing plans will not
be expanded and liberalized if the costs are made overly burdensome, particularly
for employers who generally foot most of the bill"); 120 CONG. REc. 29,949 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (noting that "it is important to recognize that if minimum
standards are set too high, we would discourage the creation of new plans"); 120
CONG. REc. 29,953 (statement of Sen. Nelson) (stating that "[iun all its deliberations and decisions, Congress was acutely aware that under our voluntary pension
system the cost of financing pension plans is an important factor in determining
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ployee benefit plans and grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts
22
to enforce its requirements.
ERISA embodies two components that regulate conduct in the administration of employee benefit plans.2 3 First, ERISA's specific reporting and
disclosure rules mandate that certain information concerning plan terms
and finances be filed with the Department of Labor, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation and the Internal Revenue Service. 24 In addition,
whether a pension plan will be adopted"). As a result of these and other concerns,
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974. See Brauch, supra, at 1239.
22. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 20, at 565, 569-71 (discussing various aspects
of ERISA preemption). Section 1144(a) of ERISA broadly preempts "all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [subject
to ERISA]." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). In addition to having exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of ERISA's requirements, the federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over suits by a participant or beneficiary to
enforce the terms of an ERISA-covered plan. See id. § 1132(e)(1).
23. For a discussion of the two components of ERISA conduct regulation in
the administration of employee benefit plans, see infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
24. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1994). A principal disclosure document required by ERISA is the summary plan description. See Bintz, supranote 8, at 981.
One commentator observed that: "A plan administrator is required to provide a
summary plan description to each plan participant within ninety days of becoming
a participant or, if later, within 120 days of the plan becoming subject to ERISA's
reporting and disclosure rules." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1); 29 C.F.R.

§ 2520.104(b)(2) (1997)). In addition, summary plan descriptions must also be
filed with the Department of Labor within 120 days of the date on which a plan
becomes subject to ERISA's reporting and disclosure rules. See id. at 981 n.6 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1)(B); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.104a-2(a)). As such, ERISA requires that a summary plan description be "written in a manner 'calculated to be
understood by the average plan participant' and must be 'sufficiently comprehensive to apprise plan participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations
under the plan.'" See id. at 981-82 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2). Moreover,
ERISA requires plan administrators to provide a summary description "of any material modifications to either the plan or other plan-related information that is
required to be included in a summary plan description within 210 days after the
end of the plan year in which the modification.., was adopted." Id. at 982 (citing
29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a)(1), 1024(b)(1)((B); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3). Finally, ERISA
requires the plan administrator to provide a fully updated summary plan description to each plan participant every five years if the plan has been amended, or
every 10 years if the plan has not been amended. See id. at 982 n.8 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b) (1) (B)).
Another disclosure document required by ERISA is the summary annual report, which summarizes the plan's financial status. See id. at 982 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b) (3)). A plan administrator must provide each participant with a summary annual report within seven months of the close of each plan year. See id.
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (3)). This report must contain "information regarding
the amount of administrative expenses incurred by the plan, the amount of benefits paid to participants and beneficiaries, the value of plan assets, income or loss
for the year, and the amount of net unrealized appreciation in plan assets during
the plan year." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104(b)-10(d)). With respect to benefit
pension plans, the summary annual report must contain a statement regarding the
plan's compliance with ERISA's minimum funding standards. See id. at 982-83 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104(b)-10(d)). Furthermore, a participant is entitled to request a copy of the full annual report, which contains detailed information
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the detailed reporting and disclosure rules mandate that certain information be disseminated to plan participants and beneficiaries, thus providing
them with the information necessary to monitor plan administration and
25
enforce their rights.
Second, ERISA imposes fiduciary standards derived from trust law on
persons with fiduciary status. 26 ERISA broadly confers fiduciary status
upon persons who have discretionary authority with respect to the management of plan assets or the administration of such a plan. 27 Moreover,
ERISA makes fiduciaries personally liable to the plan for breaches of their
duties. 28 Although ERISA does not specifically enumerate the duties of
regarding the plan's financial status and is filed each year with the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See id.,at 983 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (4)). Finally, ERISA requires various
other disclosures to be made to participants with respect to several types of plans
depending upon the circumstances. See id. at 983 n.15.
25. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 20, at 567-68 (explaining that disclosure of
plan finances may deter fiduciary misconduct and "promote[ ] economic efficiency by providing participants and beneficiaries with the information they need
to accommodate their personal financial affairs to the employer's program, as for
example, in determining their need for additional savings or insurance"). For a
description of the relevant disclosure documents required by ERISA's express reporting and disclosure rules, see supra note 24.
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a), 1104 (1994) (discussing imposition of fiduciary
standards on individuals with fiduciary status). One commentator noted that ERISA's fiduciary obligations derive from the fact that those entitled to plan assets,
namely plan participants. and beneficiaries, do not possess any managerial authority and are limited in their ability to monitor plan administration. See Wiedenbeck,
supra note 20, at 568. Because the essence of the trust relationship is the separation of enjoyment and control, the commentator explained, the trustee's obligations provided the model for the fiduciary's obligations under ERISA. See id. In
fact, the commentator observed, ERISA generally requires plan assets to be held in
trust. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994)).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994) (discussing conferral of fiduciary status under ERISA). Section 1002(21)(A) states that
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for
a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility
to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id. It is apparent from this language that ERISA fiduciary status is not limited to
those called "trustee" or "fiduciary." See Brauch, supra note 21, at 1239. Instead,
fiduciary status is based upon function rather than title. See id. Hence, an individual is a "fiduciary to the extent that he exercises discretionary authority of control
over the administration of a plan or its assets." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(1994)).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994) (discussing liability of fiduciaries under
ERISA). Section 1109(a) provides that
[a] ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such
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the fiduciary, the statutory language sets forth the general scope of fiduciary obligations attaching to employee benefit plans.2 9 A fiduciary is obligated to discharge his or her duties "solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries... for the exclusive purpose of ... providplan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including
removal of such fiduciary.
Id.
In addition to the liability provision, Congress provided a set of exclusive federal remedies for violations of ERISA. See Brauch, supra note 21, at 1241 (noting
that Congress did not adopt every state remedy that existed prior to enactment of
ERISA). Accordingly, § 1131 provides criminal penalties for anyone who willfully
violates any of ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements. See id. (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1131 (1994)). Alternatively, § 1132(a) identifies six types of civil actions
regarding ERISA violations. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994)). In particular, "[t]hree subsections of 1132(a) are relevant to individual claims for breach of
fiduciary duty." Id. at 1241-42. The first, § 1132(a) (1) (B), provides participants
and beneficiaries with the right to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan.
See id. at 1242 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). The second, § 1132(a)(2), incorporates § 1109 and provides a direct mechanism to impose personal liability on
fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duty. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)).
Finally, the third, § 1132(a) (3), uses broader language permitting recovery in certain circumstances:
A civil action may be brought.., by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation, or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this title or the terms of the plan.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3)).
It is noteworthy that, of these remedy provisions, only § 1132(a) (2) addresses
breaches of a fiduciary duty; however, because this section incorporates § 1109,
§ 1132(a) (2) only permits plan-wide relief. See id. Therefore, many courts have
settled upon the broad language of § 1132(a) (3) as the statutory basis for individual claims for breach of fiduciary duty. See id. Recently, the Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation when it held that the beneficiaries of an employee
benefit plan can bring suit in their individual capacities under § 1132 (a) (3),
rather than only on behalf of the employee benefit plan. SeeVarity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U.S. 489, 507-15 (1996). In light of the Varity holding, one commentator observed that § 1132(a)(3) provides courts with a vehicle through which to award
equitable and other appropriate relief to individuals for ERISA violations. See William L. Scogland, ERISA Case Law Update, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT, at 613, 616 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H45237, 1996) (observing that, under Varity, beneficiaries can bring suit and obtain
relief).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (defining scope of fiduciary's obligations under
ERISA). Section 1104(a) provides, in relevant part:
(1) ... a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; ...
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims ....
Id. § 1104(a) (1)(A)-(B).
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ing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 30 Likewise, pursuant to ERISA's
"prudent man rule," a fiduciary is obligated to discharge his or her duties
"with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims." 31 In essence, these statutory duties merely restate common law trustee obligations. 32 Nevertheless, based upon
ERISA's legislative history and the grant of'enforcement jurisdiction to the
federal courts, the United States Supreme Court has pronounced the expectation that courts are to develop a "federal common law of rights and
33
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."

B.

Fiduciary Obligations Under ERISA-Toward a Duty to Disclose That
Supplements ERISA 's Express Reporting and Disclosure Rules

1. Fiduciay Disclosure Obligations at Common Law
As previously stated, ERISA does not set forth the express duties of a
fiduciary.3 4 Therefore, the extent to which ERISA includes a duty to dis30. Id. § 1104(a) (1) (A) (i)-(ii).
31. Id.§ 1104(a)(1)(B).
32. See PERIrr, supra note 20, § 4.13; see also Bintz, supra note 8, at 989
("Although the legislative history of ERISA does not specifically address . . .
whether a fiduciary duty to disclose supplements ERISA's express reporting and
disclosure rules, it does reflect that ERISA's fiduciary duty rules are based upon
common law trust principles.").
33. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). Of course, the
development of such federal common law "may diverge over time from state common law, in pursuit of Congressional policy decisions embodied in ERISA." PERPRrrr, supra note 20, § 4.13. Indeed, one commentator noted that
under pre-ERISA common law trust principles, trustees had a fiduciary
duty to disclose information to plan participants under certain circumstances. The legislative history of ERISA contains no evidence of an intent to limit the scope of the federal common law rights and obligations
that would be developed under ERISA, other than that they should be
developed bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans.
Bintz, supra note 8, at 989. (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083).
Recently, in Varity, the Supreme Court asserted that "trust law does not tell the
entire story." Varity, 516 U.S. at 497. Therefore, the Court expressed that "the law
of trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an
effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties." Id. The Court advocated treating
trust law as a starting point "after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to
what extent, the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust requirements." Id.
34. See PERRITT, supra note 20, § 4.13 (drawing analogy between fiduciary duties under ERISA and common law fiduciary duties). Although there is an absence
of language regarding the express duties of a fiduciary under ERISA, it is noteworthy that the nature of the common law fiduciary duty between the trustee and
beneficiary imposes certain duties even though such duties are not expressly enu-
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close information to plan participants and beneficiaries that supplements
its express reporting and disclosure requirements is uncertain. 35 Because
the general purview of ERISA's fiduciary obligations is determined with
regard to common law trust principles, understanding the scope of a fiduciary's duty to disclose at common law is crucial to understanding the
scope of such a duty under ERISA.3 6 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts,

which describes the fiduciary's duty to disclose at common law, provides
that a trustee has a "duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary
does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection
in dealing with a third person with respect to his interest."37 Prior to the
enactment of ERISA, courts applied this general disclosure obligation to
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans. 38 In light of the fact that the premerated in the trust instrument. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 (noting that common
law trust principles apply to ERISA fiduciary obligations).

35. See Bintz, supra note 8, at 988. One commentator observed that "[t]he
express language of ERISA provides little indication as to whether there is ever a
fiduciary duty to disclose information to participants and beneficiaries. Neither
ERISA's fiduciary duty nor reporting and disclosure rules directly address the relationship between the two sets of rules." Id.
36. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 (recognizing that common law trust principles
apply with regard to ERISA fiduciary obligations "'bearing in mind the special
nature and purpose of employee benefit plans"' (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931280, at 302 (1974))); see also Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v.
Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (noting that Congress invoked
common law of trust to define duties and authority of ERISA fiduciaries); H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, at 26 (1974) ("[T]he fiduciary responsibility section, in essence,
codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in
the evolution of the law of trusts."), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649; H.R.
REP. No. 93-1280, at 66 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5076; S. REP.
No. 93-127, at 109 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865; Bintz, supra
note 8, at 985 (noting that "the scope of a fiduciary's duty to disclose at common
law is highly relevant to the existence and scope of such a duty under ERISA").
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959); see PERRIrr, supra
note 20, § 4.13 ("Generally, the common law of trusts, incorporated by ERISA,
imposes on trustees duties of loyalty to the beneficiaries and duties of care in administering the trust.").
38. See Bintz, supra note 8, at 985 (discussing application of general disclosure
obligation prior to enactment of ERISA). Prior to the enactment of ERISA, pension and welfare benefit plans were subject to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act ("Act"). See id. at 985 n.21 (citing Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829)). The Act required
private pension plans covering more than 25 employees to file a plan description
with the Department of Labor, maintain a copy of the plan description at the principal office of the plan and provide a copy of the plan description to participants
and beneficiaries upon request. See id. The Act required the plan description to
describe the procedures a participant had to follow to file a claim for benefits or
obtain review of a denied claim. See id. In addition, the Act required that the plan
description be accompanied by a copy of the plan or the instrument by which the
plan was created or funded. See id. Nevertheless, the Act did not require that the
plan description explain the vesting rules or events that could result in the forfeiture of benefits. See id. Finally, the Act required private pension plans covering
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100 or more participants to publish and file an annual report of the plan's operations. See id.
Although the Act failed to encompass express fiduciary standards, state courts
applied general trustee disclosure obligations to fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans. See id. at 985. One commentator specifically focused on several key preERISA state court decisions to illustrate this point. See id. at 985-87. In the first of
these decisions, the New Jersey Supeior Court held that the trustees of a pension
fund had a fiduciary duty to disclose the plan's eligibility requirements to all potential participants. See Branch v. White, 239 A.2d 665, 671 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1968). In Branch, the plan, which had been established through a collective
bargaining agreement between a union and an association of contractors, required
participating employees to contribute two dollars each month to fund the plan.
See id. at 667. The' plaintiffs, who were not members of the union, claimed that
they had not been informed of the plan or its eligibility requirements, and that
only members of the union had been informed. See id. at 668. The court reversed
and remanded a lower court decision in favor of the defendant trustees, holding
that the trustees had a fiduciary duty to make full disclosure to the nonmembers of
the union regarding the conditions for participation in the plan. See id. at 671; see
also Shallcross Express, Inc. v. Trucking & Allied Indus. Pension Fund, 290 A.2d
744, 751 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (requiring trustees to fully disclose all
facts within their knowledge that are material to protection of beneficiaries'
interests).
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals held that the trustees of a pension
fund had a fiduciary duty to disclose the manner in which they were interpreting a
short-term contribution provision when such interpretation resulted in adverse
consequences to the beneficiaries of the pension fund. See Lix v. Edwards, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 294, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1978). In Lix, the plaintiffs worked for an employer
who contributed to their pension fund for 38 months until it sold its assets. See id.
at 296. After purchasing the assets, the second employer contributed to the pension fund for 17 months before permanently closing the facility and ceasing pension fund payments. See id. at 297. The pension fund included a short-term
contribution provision under which the trustees of the pension fund could terminate employee pension benefits if the employer's obligation to contribute to the
pension fund ended before 48 months See id. at 296. Pursuant to this short-term
contribution provision, the trustees declared that the second employer was a new
and separate contributing employer that failed to contribute for 48 months and,
therefore, terminated the plaintiffs' pension benefits. See id. at 297. Nevertheless,
the court reversed and remanded a lower court decision in favor of the trustees,
concluding that prior to the trustees' acceptance of the second employer as a new
contributing employer, the trustees had a fiduciary duty to provide written notice
to the plaintiffs of any adverse consequences regarding the transfer of assets to the
second employer if such transfer would create a break in employer contributions
under the pension plan. See id. at 299-300. Accordingly, the court held that the
trustees were estopped from terminating the plaintiffs' benefits because the trust-

ees failed to provide such notice. See id.
Finally, a third case signaled more recent decisions addressing the issue of
whether a fiduciary has a duty to provide individualized disclosure to plan participants and beneficiaries under ERISA. See Erion v. Timken Co., 368 N.E.2d 312,
313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). In Erion, the surviving spouse of a deceased retiree
claimed that her husband's former employer negligently failed to advise her husband that if he delayed his retirement for seven days his spouse would be entitled
to a survivor death benefit. See id. at 313-14. The plaintiff's husband had discussed
his retirement with a representative of the employer's insurance department; however, the representative did not inform the plaintiff's husband that a seven-day
delay in his retirement would entitle his wife to a survivor's benefit. See id. at 317.
As a result, the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that a fiduciary relationship existed between the employer and its employees regarding the discussions it had
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ERISA common law, which provides the foundation for ERISA's fiduciary
standards, acknowledged a fiduciary duty to disclose information to participants and beneficiaries in certain circumstances, there is "no wellgrounded basis on which wholly to exclude a duty to disclose from ERISA's fiduciary requirements.
2.

' 39

Interpretation of ERISA's Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Regarding Potential
Plan Changes in the Federal Courts of Appeals

Precedent has established that the employer "wears two hats" in administering employee benefit plans. 40 Courts have observed the inherent

conflict in an "employer's prerogative to initiate discretionary policy decisions such as creating, amending, or terminating a particular plan ...

for

the benefit and interests of its participant-employees." 4 1 Hence, a particularly difficult issue that employers face is whether there is ever a fiduciary
duty to disclose plan changes that are under consideration, but not yet
adopted or implemented.
Until recently, the Supreme Court of the United States had never de42
fined the scope of an employer's fiduciary duty to disclose under ERISA.
In Varity Corp. v. Howe,43 however, the Supreme Court established that the
through its insurance department with prospective retirees and that, although the
company did not have a duty to explain "every conceivable legal ramification of
the pension plan to its employees, certainly the more obvious and pertinent points
should have been brought to the attention of the employees without the requirement of a specific question on the subject by the employee." Id. Therefore, the
court held that the employer was negligent in failing to inform the plaintiff's husband that the plaintiff would have been entitled to a survivor death benefit if he
had delayed his retirement for seven days. See id.
39. Bintz, supra note 8, at 989. One commentator noted that
[g]iven ERISA's clear legislative purpose, however, such a duty should be
imposed in a particular situation only to the extent that doing so clearly
advances ERISA's goal of protecting the interests of participants and beneficiaries, and is consistent with Congress' desire to encourage the development of the private pension and welfare benefit system while not
placing undue burdens upon it. In addition, because ERISA expressly
provides detailed reporting and disclosure rules, a presumption against
imposing a fiduciary duty to disclose should apply to the extent that imposing such a duty would contradict or supplant an express reporting and
disclosure requirement.
Id. at 989-90.
40. Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992).
41. Id.
42. For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court denied or dismissed
certiorari and, therefore, refused to define the scope of an employer's fiduciary
duty to disclose under ERISA, see Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988); Amato v. Western Union Int'l,
Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 113 (1986);
Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co., 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 1109 (1985).
43. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
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scope of such duty is quite broad. 44 In Varity, the Court held that an employer violated its ERISA fiduciary obligations by materially misleading its
employees in matters related to an employee benefits plan.4 5 Because
Varity involved an employer that made material misrepresentations to plan
participants, the Supreme Court did not have to "reach the question of
whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful in46
formation on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries."
Hence, in the wake of Varity, an unsettled temporal issue regarding potential plan changes remains for the United States courts of appealswhether this fiduciary duty to disclose begins at the time of, or prior to,
the adoption of a plan amendment.
Although the federal courts of appeals agree that plan administrators
have a fiduciary duty not to affirmatively misrepresent material facts to
plan participants, the law remains unsettled regarding the scope of a fiduciary's duty to disclose beyond the specific reporting and disclosure requirements of ERISA. 47 Specifically, the federal courts of appeals vary in
their response to the issue of whether a fiduciary has a duty to disclose
plan changes that are under consideration, but not yet adopted. 48 Some
44. Id. at 496-507 (discussing scope of fiduciary duty to disclose under
ERISA).
45. Id. at 506-07. Varity involved an employer who made misrepresentations
regarding the security of its employees' benefits to induce several employees to
transfer to a separate division the employer had created for its failing businesses.
See id. at 492-94. Subsequently, the division ended its second year in a receivership
and the employees lost their nonpension benefits. See id. at 495. Accordingly, the
Court found that the employer participated "knowingly and significantly in deceiving [plan beneficiaries] in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries
[ ] expense." Id. at 500. As such, the Court determined that this was not an act
solely in the beneficiaries' interest and, therefore, held that the employer
breached its fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information. See id. at 506-07.
46. Id. at 506.
47. See, e.g., Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 49 F.3d 982, 990 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stating that plan administrators would breach fiduciary duty by making misrepresentations regarding possible changes to plan); Maez v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1499-1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Swinney v. General
Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Vartanian v. Monsanto
Co., 14 F.3d 697, 702 (lst Cir. 1994) (same); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858
F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
48. Compare Sutter v. BASF Corp., 964 F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding
that company is not acting as fiduciary agent when deciding to amend or terminate welfare benefits plan), Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 541, 544 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that employer did not breach duty by failing to notify employees of provision under which employer retained right to amend retirement plan), Payonk v.
HMW Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that "an employer's
lawful termination decision, absent affirmative misrepresentations designed to mislead plan participants, is not governed by ERISA's standards of fiduciary duties"),
and Porto v. Armco, 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to recognize
fiduciary duty to disclose that supplements ERISA's specific reporting and disclosure rules), with FischerI, 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that employer
may breach fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to disclose information regard-
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courts have approached this issue by refusing to recognize a fiduciary duty
to disclose potential plan changes that supplements ERISA's express reporting and disclosure rules. 49 For instance, in Porto v. Armco, Inc.,50 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that plan administrators do not have to provide disclosure earlier than required by
ERISA's statutory disclosure standards to meet their fiduciary duty. 5 1 Instead, the court reasoned that a fiduciary duty is discharged once the plan
administrators meet ERISA's express disclosure requirements. 52 Although
Porto broadly rejects the existence of a fiduciary duty to disclose that supplements ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements, plan administrators should not exclusively rely on this decision because the Eighth
Circuit's holding is contrary to other circuit decisions that have expanded
a fiduciary's disclosure duties beyond ERISA's express terms under certain
53
conditions.
ing plan change under serious consideration), Drennan v. General Motors Corp.,
977 F.2d 246, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding that employer had fiduciary duty
to keep plan participants informed of its serious consideration of plan change so
that participants could make meaningful decision in selecting appropriate plan),
Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750 ("A fiduciary has a duty not only to inform a beneficiary of
new and relevant information as it arises, but also to advise him of circumstances
that threaten interests relevant to the relationship."), Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1163-64
(holding that fiduciary duty to avoid misrepresentations arose once employer gave
serious consideration to plan), Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Lying is inconsistent
with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a) (1) of
ERISA .... ."), and Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1981) (indicating
that fiduciary duty to disclose plan changes may supplement ERISA's express reporting and disclosure rules upon finding that notice of plan change that complied with and even went beyond ERISA's express disclosure requirements "would
seem sufficient for all but the unusual case").
49. See Porto, 825 F.2d at 1276 (refusing to recognize fiduciary duty to disclose
that supplements ERISA's specific reporting and disclosure rules); see also Sutter,
964 F.2d at 562 (finding that company is not acting as fiduciary agent when deciding to amend or terminate welfare benefits plan); Barnes,927 F.2d at 544 (holding
that employer did not breach duty by failing to notify employees of provision
under which employer retained right to amend retirement plan); Stanton v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It is not a violation of ERISA to fail
to furnish information regarding amendments before these amendments are put
into effect.").
50. 825 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 1276. In Porto, the plaintiff made an irrevocable decision to defer
certain distributions from the company pension plan upon retirement. See id. at
1274-75. Subsequently, the company adopted a plan allowing "once irrevocable
decision[s] on withdrawal choices upon retirement to be revocable." Id. at 1275.
As such, the plan administrator notified all of the local employed plan participants
of the amendment, but did not notify the local retired plan participants, such as

the plaintiff. See id.
52. See id. at 1276 (affirming district court conclusion that "as a matter of law,
a breach of fiduciary duty claim cannot be based on failure to disclose when the
statutory disclosure requirements have been met").
53. See Bintz, supra note 8, at 993 (discussing United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit's holding in relation to decisions of other federal courts of
appeals).
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Indeed, other courts have expanded a fiduciary's disclosure duties to
encompass a duty to disclose plan changes that are under consideration,
but not yet implemented. 5 4 For instance, in Drennan v. General Motors
Corp.,55 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
plan administrators have an affirmative duty to disclose information regarding future plan amendments under serious consideration to affected
employees. 5 6 One commentator interpreted the Drennan opinion as requiring a fiduciary to disclose the fact that plan changes are under serious
57
Simiconsideration, but not the details of the decision-making process.
54. See, e.g., Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991-92
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding that fidicuary duty to disclose material facts affecting interests of beneficiaries exists regardless of whether he or she asks for information);
Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
plan administrators have duty to disclose plan changes that are under serious consideration); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747, 749 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (ruling that plan administrators have duty to disclose complete and correct
material information about plan options to plan participants).
55. 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 251. In Drennan,a class of laid-off employees who had waived certain employment rights in exchange for lump-sum payments under a supplemental
unemployment plan claimed that the defendant employer breached its fiduciary
duties by failing to disclose that it was seriously considering making a more generous plan available to them. See id. at 249. Before the plaintiffs accepted the supplemental unemployment plan, they had questioned management about the
possibility of coverage under the more generous plan. See id. In response, management informed them that the plan would not be made available to them despite the fact that it was seriously considering making the plan available to them.
See id. Therefore: the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
that the employer had a fiduciary duty to keep the plaintiffs informed of its consideration to permit their participation in the more generous plan so as to enable
them to arrive at a meaningful decision. See id. at 251. Likewise, the court broadly
stated that a fiduciary "'has a duty not only to inform a beneficiary of new and
relevant information as it arises, but also to advise him of circumstances that
threaten interests relevant to the relationship.'" Id. (quoting Eddy, 919 F.2d at
750).
Prior to Drennan, the Sixth Circuit addressed similar claims in another case,
but decided the claims on a narrower rationale. See Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel.,
858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988). In Berlin, the court held that once the plan
fiduciary gave "serious consideration" to the plan change, it had a duty not to
make misrepresentations concerning the plan change. See id. In contrast to the
broad language of Drennan, the Sixth Circuit noted in Berlin that it was not holding
that a plan fiduciary had any duty "to say anything at all or to communicate with
potential plan participants about [future plan changes]." Id. at 1164. Subsequent
to Drennan, it seems the Sixth Circuit may have returned to this narrower rationale.
See Muse v. International Business Machs. Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing serious consideration as narrow exception to general rule that fiduciaries are not required to disclose changes in plan before adoption), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct, 1844 (1997).
57. See Bintz, supra note 8, at 995. Addressing some contradictory language in
the Drennan opinion, one commentator explained that
[t]hough the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that "the duty
to avoid material misrepresentations does not require the employer to
predict an ultimate decision to offer a plan so long as it fairly discloses the
progress of its serious considerations to make a plan available to affected
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larly, in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America,5 8 the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a fiduciary's duty is
not discharged by mere compliance with ERISA's express reporting and
disclosure rules. 5 9 Rather, the court imposed an obligation on the plan
administrator not only to avoid misleading participants, but also to fulfill
the affirmative duty to disclose complete and correct material information
about plan options to plan participants. 6° The Eddy court's broad language is regarded as the most expansive interpretation of the fiduciary
61
duty to disclose under ERISA.
In contrast to the latter approach, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has restricted a fiduciary's disclosure duties concerning plan changes that are under consideration, but not yet imple-

employees," it also stated that the duty to provide complete and accurate
information in response to participants' questions, "does not require the
fiduciary to disclose its internal deliberations." Based on these somewhat
contradictory statements, it appears that when changes to a plan are
under consideration, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would
require a fiduciary to disclose that fact, but not the details of the decisionmaking process.
Id. (quoting Drennan, 977 F.2d at 251).
58. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
59. Id. at 750. In Eddy, the plaintiff asked the plan fiduciary about converting
rights under an employer-sponsored group health policy to an individual policy
and was mistakenly told that he did not have such rights. See id. at 749. Relying on
this information, the plaintiff failed to convert and, as a result, his health coverage
terminated. See id. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the plaintiff's claim that the plan fiduciary breached its
duties under ERISA by misinforming the plaintiff regarding the conversion rights.
See id.
60. See id.; see also Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986,
991-92 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Fiduciaries must also communicate material facts affecting the interests of beneficiaries. This duty exists when a beneficiary asks fiduciaries for information, and even when he or she does not." (citations omitted)).
61. See, e.g., Bintz, supra note 8, at 998 ("The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., however, has created substantial uncertainty and concern among plan sponsors and fiduciaries by indicating that ERISA's fiduciary duty rules may encompass a broad duty to provide
individualized disclosure.").
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mented. 62 For example, in Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., the court ruled that
a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan has no affirmative duty to disclose

information regarding a proposed plan change prior to its adoption to
employees who failed to request such information.

64

62. See Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir.) (holding that plan
fiduciaries are not 'required to volunteer information regarding potential plan
changes and, thus, limiting plan fiduciaries' disclosure duties to situations in which
they voluntarily disseminate such information), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 302 (1996).
Consistent with other circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a plan fiduciary may not make affirmative material misrepresentations about proposed future changes to an employee benefit plan in Mullins v.
Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994). Subsequently, in a recent case, the
Second Circuit considered the contours of its Mullins decision, holding that the
"serious consideration" of a potential plan change is not a prerequisite to the materiality inquiry when a plan fiduciary makes affirmative misrepresentations to plan
beneficiaries that lead them to believe that future plan changes will not be implemented. See Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, the Second Circuit concluded that once it is established that the plan
fiduciary made affirmative misrepresentations, "[w]hether a plan is under serious
consideration is but one factor in the materiality inquiry." Id. at 123. Indeed, the
court found that the materiality inquiry "turns primarily on the nature and context
of the [plan fiduciary's] assurance." Id. at 124. In contrast to its decision in Ballone, which involved a plan fiduciary who responded to employee inquiries, the
Pocchia court held that a plan fiduciary need not volunteer information to plan beneficiaries regarding proposed plan changes that have not been adopted in the absence of specific inquiry. Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278. In this regard, the Second
Circuit's approach is similar to the approach adopted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which has held that "[i]t is not a violation of
ERISA to fail to furnish information regarding amendments before these amendments are put into effect." Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir.
1986).
63. 81 F.3d 275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 302 (1996).
64. Id. at 278. Pocchia involved a plaintiff who voluntarily resigned from his
position with the defendant. Id. at 277. Several months later, the defendant announced a new early retirement incentive program that would have provided the
plaintiff with greater benefits. See id. Although the plaintiff had already resigned,
he requested that the defendant include him in the new program. See id. Upon
the defendant's refusal to do so, the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court,
claiming that the defendant had breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to inform him at the time of his retirement that it had decided to implement
the program or, alternatively, that it was considering implementing the program.
See id. After the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that ERISA imposed no such duty on the defendant, the plaintiff
appealed. See id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit emphasized that although ERISA sets forth the
duty of plan fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of a plan's participants and
beneficiaries, it is the courts that have defined the scope of that duty as applied to
particular situations. See id. at 278. The court noted that it is well settled that plan
fiduciaries may not affirmatively mislead plan participants about changes to an
employee benefit plan, regardless of whether those changes have been adopted or
are merely proposed. See id. In contrast, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
courts have not reached a consensus regarding whether, in the absence of an inquiryfrom a participant or beneficiary, fiduciaries have an affirmative duty to disclose plan changes that have been proposed or are under consideration, but not
adopted. See id. The court observed that such an affirmative duty has been imposed only incases inwhich the fiduciary's failure to voluntarily disclose contem-
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In summary, the foregoing circuit decisions illustrate that no intelligible standard has emerged for determining whether the imposition of a
fiduciary duty to disclose that supplements ERISA's express reporting and
disclosures rules is appropriate in certain circumstances or, more specifically, whether there is ever a fiduciary duty to disclose plan changes that
are under consideration, but not yet adopted. Because this Casebrief is
concerned with the law regarding this issue in the Third Circuit and considering that the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, examining
the other circuits' decisions simply provides the context in which to view
the Third Circuit approach.
3.

The Evolution of ERISA 's FiduciaryDuty to Disclose in the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit has embraced a broad interpretation of the ERISA
fiduciary duty to disclose. 65 In the Third Circuit, a pension plan participant may base a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA on allegaplated changes would perpetuate the participants' confusion. See id. The court
instead characterized the plaintiffs case as the more common situation in which a
participant simply believed that he should have been given more information to
make an informed decision. See id.
In this regard, the court held that ERISA does not require plan fiduciaries to
voluntarily disclose changes in a benefit plan before such changes are adopted. See
id. The court reasoned that requiring voluntary disclosure during the formulation
of a plan or plan change would both increase the likelihood of participant confusion and impose an undue burden on management, which would be faced with
continuing uncertainty about whether and when to make such disclosures. See id.
Moreover, the court found that it could interfere with legitimate business goals,
such as work force reduction, when early retirement incentives are often used as a
last resort if retirements or resignations do not accomplish the reductions desired.
See id. The court noted that employees would be unlikely to retire or resign if they
knew that a possible incentive was being contemplated. See id.
Finally, the court emphasized that permitting plan fiduciaries to keep their
pre-adoption deliberations a secret would not frustrate ERISA's purpose of ensuring that participants have sufficient information to enable them to confirm that
the plan is financially sound and properly administered. See id. at 279. In the
court's opinion, its bright-line rule would protect the interests of both participants
and beneficiaries, who will receive information at the earliest point at which it
actually may affect their rights, and fiduciaries, who will be required to provide
information only at the point at which it is complete and accurate. See id. Having
reached these conclusions about the law, the court found that the plaintiff had
failed to present evidence that would support his alternative contention that the
defendant had already adopted the program at the time of his resignation. See id.
at 279-80.
65. Cf In re Unisys Corp., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that
"satisfaction by [a] . . . plan administrator of its ... disclosure obligations under
ERISA does not foreclose the possibility that the plan administrator may ... breach
its fiduciary duty.., to communicate candidly, if the plan administrator simultaneously or subsequently makes material misrepresentations to those whom the duty
of loyalty and prudence are owed"); Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) ("This duty to inform is a constant
thread in the relationship between beneficiary and trustee; it entails not only a
negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the
trustee knows that silence might be harmful."); FischerI,994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir.
1993) ("A plan administrator may not make affirmative material misrepresenta-
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tions that a plan administrator affirmatively and materially misrepresented
the terms of a plan. 66 Case law provides that an ERISA fiduciary has a duty
under § 1104(a) to convey complete and accurate information regarding
67
plan benefits when it communicates with plan participants.
For example, in Bixler v. CentralPennsylvania Teamster Health & Welfare
Fund,68 the court adopted the District of Columbia Circuit's broad construction of the duty to disclose. 69 The court held that a fiduciary has a
duty to disclose complete and accurate information that is material to the
plan participant's or beneficiary's circumstances even if their circumstances are broader than their inquiry. 70 The Third Circuit's expansive
construction of the duty to disclose under ERISA, however, is perhaps best
illustrated by its ruling in Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.7 1 In Taylor, the
court held that a plan administrator may even be held liable for the material misrepresentations made by individuals selected by the plan administrator as nonfiduciary agents to assist in its fiduciary obligation to
72
administer the plan.
tions to plan participants about changes to an employee pension benefits plan.
Put simply when a plan administrator speaks, it must speak truthfully.").
66. See Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1298 (allowing plan participants to seek individual
relief for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA). In Bixler, the Third Circuit
adopted the rationale of Justice Brennan from his concurring opinion in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Bixler, 12 F.3d at
1298. In Massachusetts Mutual Justice Brennan, who was joined by three other
justices, found that "[s] ection 502 (a) (3) authorizes the award of 'appropriate equitable relief' directly to a participant or beneficiary to 'redress' 'any act or practice
which violates any provision of this title.'" Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 153
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 502(a) (3) (1994)). Accordingly,
the Third Circuit held that the scope of the § 502(a) (3) "appropriate equitable
relief" clause extended to individual recovery for "breach of the statutorily created
fiduciary duty of a plan administrator." See Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1298. Subsequently,
the Supreme Court affirmed this approach in Varity. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 507-15 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Unisys Corp., 57 F.3d at 1265 n.15 (noting that ERISA fiduciary has
duty to communicate "complete and accurate" information regarding beneficiary's
status); Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300 (concluding that ERISA fiduciary has duty to convey
complete and accurate information that is material to beneficiary's circumstance);
FischerI,994 F.2d at 135 (stating that ERISA fiduciary has obligation to answer plan
participants' questions in forthright manner).
68. 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 1300 (adopting District of Columbia Circuit's expansive interpretation of duty to disclose under ERISA, as established in Eddy).
70. See id.
71. 49 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 988-89. In Taylor, the court addressed a breach of fiduciary duty
claim under ERISA based on statements made by a company supervisor who was
not a member of the fiduciary committee administering the benefit plan. Id. The
court concluded that the ERISA fiduciary plan administrator would be responsible
for the nonfiduciary's actions in the event that a misrepresentation was made because the supervisor had apparent authority to act as an agent of the administrator
and could bind the plan and its fiduciaries. See id. On the facts of Taylor, however,
the court found that no such misrepresentation had been made. Id. at 989-90.
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Indeed, it seems that the imposition of an ERISA duty to disclose in
the Third Circuit turns on the materiality of the information or misinformation.7 3 As such, the evolution of the fiduciary duty to disclose under
ERISA has peaked with the court's formulation of its materiality inquiry in
Fischer Ij.74

1II.
A.

1.

DISCUSSION

The Facts and ProceduralHistory Regarding the Fischer II Breach of
FiduciaryDuty to Disclose Claim: When the Employees Ask

Facts
In FischerII, the defendant employer, Philadelphia Electric Company

("Company"), administered its employees' retirement and pension benefits plan, thus triggering fiduciary obligations under ERISA. 75 In December 1989, the president of the Company announced to employees that the
Company might consider an early retirement program if the Public Utility
76
Commission ("PUC") denied the Company's request for a rate increase.
Following an administrative lawjudge's interim decision on March 1, 1990
that recommended the Company receive only a fraction of its requested
rate increase, the Company quickly began to develop a set of early retirement alternatives. 77 On March 20, the Company solicited a report on pos73. See, e.g., In re Unisys Corp., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that
ERISA fiduciary has duty not to misinform employees through material misrepresentations); Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300 (stating that duty to disclose material information is main responsibility of fiduciary); FischerI, 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that ERISA fiduciary may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants).
74. Fischer II, 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997).
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in FischerII, see infra notes 75-131
and accompanying text.
75. FischerII, 96 F.3d at 1536.
76. See id. at 1537. Philadelphia Electric Company ("Company") had considered early retirement programs during the previous year as part of a "long practice" of reviewing its retirement and pension benefits in the ordinary course of
business; however, for various reasons, the Company had chosen not to implement
the program. See id. at 1536-37. In July 1989, the Company requested a rate increase from the Public Utility Commission ("PUC"). See id. The PUC's preliminary recommendation granted the Company less than half of its requested rate
increase. See id. As a result, the Company hired a consulting firm to explore longterm strategies and cost-cutting measures. See id. The president of the Company
used the consulting firm's report to calculate the savings that an early retirement
program could produce. See id.
On December 13, 1989, the president held three meetings with employees to
discuss the importance of the rate increase to the Company. See id. In response to
questions posed by employees, he stated that an early retirement plan might be
considered if the rate request was denied. See id. Nevertheless, he explained that
the Company had no plans for such a program because the outcome of the rate
increase was uncertain. See id.
77. See id. at 1537.
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sible programs from a benefits consulting firm. 78 On April 7, at a
corporate strategy meeting attended by the Company's senior executives,
the president stated that he planned to announce a $100 million cost-cutting program on April 20. 79 On April 19, the PUC granted the Company a
rate increase of only fifty percent of the Company's request, and the president announced the early retirement program the same day.80
During the time of the foregoing events, some of the Company's employees were considering retirement. 81 Pursuant to company policy, prospective retirees would notify the Company several months before they
planned to retire and schedule an informational retirement interview with
a Company benefits counselor. 82 Six months prior to the president's announcement, rumors about the early retirement plan began to circulate
and some prospective retirees asked the benefits counselors about the possibility that such a plan would be adopted. 83 Prior to the president's announcement, the counselors responded that either no plan was being
84
considered or that they had no knowledge of any plan.
2.

ProceduralHistory

The plaintiffs in Fischer II were employees who retired on January 1,
February 1, March 1 and April 1, 1990, and who, therefore, were ineligible
to obtain the benefits provided by the early retirement plan, but otherwise
would have been eligible. 8 5 The plaintiffs alleged, among other things,
that the Company breached its fiduciary duties under § 1104 of ERISA
mainly through the misrepresentations made by its benefits counselors
when the plaintiffs asked if the Company was considering an early retire86
ment plan.
78. See id.
79. See id.

80. See FischerI, 994 F.2d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 1993). On May 25, the Board of
Directors formally approved the early retirement program, which provided certain
options that benefitted employees who elected to retire between July 15 and September 15, 1990. See id.
81. See id.

82. See id. ("The purpose of the interview was to provide the employee with
information about retirement, including pension amount and options for life
insurance.").
83. See id.

84. See id. The court observed that
[a]s far as the benefits counselors knew, they were telling the truth since
the Company had not kept them abreast of any discussions taking place
among senior management. Moreover, [their supervisor] had instructed
them that if interviewees asked any questions, they were to be told "exactly what the plan called for at that time."
Id.
85. Id.

86. See id. at 132-35. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the Company was
estopped from denying the class members increased pension benefits and that the
Company engaged in discriminatory conduct in violation of § 510 of ERISA. See
FischerI, 96 F.3d 1533, 1543-44 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing plaintiff's allegations
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In 1992, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the Company's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the Company was under no duty to disclose the potential
plan changes to the plaintiffs prior to the April 19, 1990 announcement as
long as it made no material misrepresentations regarding its intention to
alter the plan. 8 7 Likewise, the court found that the benefits counselors'
statements were not material misrepresentations because the potential
changes to the plan had not been finalized. 88 On appeal, however, in
Fischer I, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that misrepresentations become material at the point in which the employer "seriously considers" the
plan changes. 89 Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded the case so that
the district court could determine the date when consideration became
serious. 90 On remand, the district court chose March 12, the date of initial contact between the Company and the benefits consulting firm, as the
date when serious consideration began.9 1 In Fischer II, the Third Circuit
reversed this finding and held that April 7, the date when senior management met to discuss the benefits consulting firm's proposals, was the date
when serious consideration began. 9 2 Therefore, the Third Circuit held
that any employee who asked about a potential plan change after April 7,
1990, but before the formal announcement on April 19, 1990, received
material misinformation and would have established a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. 93 Nevertheless, all the plaintiffs had retired
before April 7 and, therefore, the court entered judgment for the Com94
pany on the plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim.
regarding denial of increased pension benefits), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997).
These claims, however, are beyond the scope of this Casebrief.
87. See Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., Nos. CIV.A 90-8020, CIV.A 91-2771,
1992 WL 187107, at *21 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1992), rev'd, 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1993).
88. See id. at *22.
89. See Fischer I, 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993).

90. See id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in FischerI, see infra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
91. See Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., Nos. CIV.A 90-8020, CIV.A 91-2771,
1994 WL 194836, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1994), rev'd, 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir.
1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997). The court concluded that the Company began its serious consideration of the plan change on March 12, 1990. See id.
Indeed, the court focused on the fact that the Company had contacted the consulting firm on this date concerning its need to reduce cost quickly. See id. Conversely, in Fischer II, the Third Circuit found that March 12, 1990, was not the
correct date when serious consideration began. See FischerII, 96 F.3d 1533, 1542
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997). The court held that the action
on March 12, 1990, fell "under the rubric of' preliminary information gathering.

Id. Likewise, the options were considered exclusively by a member of middle management without the authority to implement such a plan change. See id. For an indepth discussion of the Third Circuit's serious consideration formulation, see infra
notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
92. See Fischer II, 96 F.3d at 1541. For an in-depth discussion of the FischerII
holding, see infra notes 99-131 and accompanying text.
93. See Fischer I,96 F.3d at 1543.
94. See id.
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The Third Circuit's Analysis of the Claim for Breach of the ERISA
FiduciaryDuty to Disclose in Fischer II

The Third Circuit'sInterpretationof ERISA 's FiduciaryDuty to Disclose

In FischerI, the court held that a plan administrator breaches its fiduciary duties under § 1104(a) of ERISA by making affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about changes to an employee
pension benefit plan or, "[p] ut simply, when a plan administrator speaks,
it must speak truthfully."9 5 This "rule of truthfulness" focuses on the materiality of the plan administrator's misrepresentation. 9 6 A misrepresentation is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that it would mislead a
reasonable employee in making an adequately informed decision about if
and when to retire. 97 The key factor in the materiality inquiry is the degree of seriousness with which the plan administrator is considering a par98
ticular change at the time the misrepresentation is made.
Indeed, the "serious consideration" factor controls the materiality
test; however, in Fischer I, the court failed to define this nebulous concept,
yet remanded the case. On review, the court was dissatisfied with the district judge's determination of when the employer's consideration of the
plan change became serious.9 9 Therefore, in Fischer II, the court ex95. Fischer 1, 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993). In Fischer I and Kurz I, the
Third Circuit assumed that individual breach of fiduciary duty claims were proper,
but in neither case did the court discuss ERISA's text or provide justification for
why individual claims for breach of fiduciary duty were proper. This development,
however, was not confounding in light of Bixler, an earlier decision in which the
court explained its position of allowing plan participants to seek individual relief
for breaches of fiduciary duty. Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298-1300 (3d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this aspect of
Bixler, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
96. See Fischer1, 994 F.2d at 135. As to the standard of review, the court stated
that whether a communication to a plan participant constitutes an affirmative misrepresentation is a question of fact; however, the issue of liability for breach of
fiduciary duty turns on whether the affirmative misrepresentation is material,
which is a mixed question of law and fact. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. ("All else equal, the more seriously a plan change is being considered, the more likely a misrepresentation, e.g., that no change is under consideration, will pass the threshold of materiality."). Several other circuits addressing this
issue have agreed that "serious consideration" is the controlling standard. See
Hockett v. Sun Co., Inc., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting serious
consideration standard with regard to fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA to disclose
potential plan changes); Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Inc., 54 F.3d 1488,
1500-01 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246,
251 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he duty to avoid material misrepresentations does not
require the employer to predict an ultimate decision to offer a plan so long as it
fairly discloses the progress of its serious considerations to make a plan available to
affected employees."); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that once employer gave "serious consideration" to implementing plan change, fiduciary had duty not to make misrepresentations concerning plan change).
99. See Fischer II, 96 F.3d at 1536 ("We find the district court misunderstood
the concept of 'serious consideration"').
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plained the formulation of the "serious consideration" standard and applied it to the facts of the case.' 0 0
2.

Balancing the Competing Interests in a Breach of the ERISA Fiduciay Duty
to Disclose Claim

In its rationale, the Third Circuit noted that the concept of serious
consideration balances the tension between the employers' need to operate their businesses and the employees' right to information. 1 1 The court
recognized that operating a business requires developing strategies and
evaluating options in the decision-making process.' 0 2 Because full disclosure at each step of the process would be impractical, the court requires
1° 3
disclosure only when consideration of a plan change becomes serious.
100. Id. at 1539-43 (discussing "serious consideration" formulation and applying to facts). The Third Circuit also applied the serious consideration formulation
in the companion case to FischerI. See Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544
(3d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Kuz I]. Kurz I involved principally the same facts as
Fischer II. See id. at 1547-48 (discussing factual background of case). The main
factual differences between the cases were that the alleged breach of fiduciary duty
in Kurz R occurred in 1987 (prior to the alleged breach in FischerI) and the alleged breach involved failures to disclose information regarding potential plan
changes in response to employees' inquiries, rather than explicit denials (as in
FischerI1). See id. at 1548-50.
101. See Fischer , 96 F.3d at 1539 (discussing balancing of interests in "serious
consideration" standard); see also Carleen, supra note 3, at 36 (discussing serious
consideration and stating that "[ilts virtue is its consonance with the underlying
principles of ERISA"). The court noted that it had recognized these competing
interests in FischerI. See FischerI, 96 F.3d at 1539. The court recalled that it had

based its holding on the employees' need for truthful information; however, it had

also recognized a concomitant "'right [of] an employer to make the business deci-

sion of how much and when to enhance pension benefits.'" Id. (quoting FischerI,
994 F.2d at 133).
102. See FischerII, 96 F.3d at 1539.
103. See id. (determining when disclosure is required under ERISA). The

court noted that large corporations could not function if ERISA required full disclosure at each step of the decision-making process because various levels of corporate management regularly consider changes in their benefits packages as part of
an ongoing process of cost-monitoring and personnel management. See id.
It is noteworthy that one district court, in a case that was factually similar to

FischerI, attacked the practicality of the serious consideration analysis on the same
grounds. See Bettis v. Thompson, 932 F. Supp. 173, 175 (S.D. Tex. 1996). In Bettis,
an employee heard rumors regarding the adoption of an early retirement plan and
inquired about them. Id. The employee's supervisor did not know about an early
retirement plan when the employee asked and refused to speculate regarding such
a plan. See id. After the employee retired, the employer announced an early retirement plan. See id. In that court's view, "[the idea of imposing a fiduciary duty
affirmatively not to mislead a beneficiary once a company has begun to take a plan
into serious consideration is unworkable." Id. The court reasoned that because
large corporations are "constantly considering [their] labor costs, determining
whether [they] should reduce [their] number of employees, and deciding how
best to compensate them," they cannot know when their consideration of plan
changes has become "serious." Id. at 176. Therefore, the court held that the employer's only duty was to accurately explain to employees the current state of the
pension plan then in effect. See id.
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Conversely, the court recognized the employees' competing need for
material information they can rely on when making employment decisions. 10 4 Nevertheless, the court found that a standard requiring full disclosure at every step of the decision-making process could result in a mass
of disclosures in which truly material information could easily be
105
overlooked.
In balancing these competing interests, the Third Circuit recognized
that ERISA does not impose a "duty of clairvoyance" on employers, which
means that employers are not obligated to disclose precise predictions regarding future plan changes. 10 6 Instead, employers are obligated to "answer participants' questions forthrightly, a duty that does not require the
10 7
[employer] to disclose its internal deliberations."

In the same vein, one commentator noted that the imposition of a fiduciary
duty to disclose plan changes that have not yet been adopted would disrupt the
normal decision-making process of businesses and hamper their ability to achieve
legitimate business goals unless the duty were strictly limited. See Bintz, supra note
8, at 997. The commentator embellished this point:
A business that for competitive reasons finds it necessary to reduce its
workforce should not be prevented from pursuing a business plan under
which an initial early retirement or severance pay plan will be improved if
a sufficient number of employees do not elect to retire or terminate employment. If an affirmative duty were imposed on fiduciaries to disclose
such a plan of action, as suggested by the court in Drennan, it would be
impossible to implement. Few employees would elect retirement or terminate employment after being informed that improved benefits would
become available if an insufficient number of employees elect to
participate.
Id. Nevertheless, the commentator agreed that a limited duty is necessary to prevent employers from making material misrepresentations with respect to plan
changes that are under serious consideration when responding to employee inquiries or at the employers' own initiative. See id. at 997-98. The commentator,
however, advocated the employers' option to decline to comment on the prospect
of future changes and instead make generalized statements to the effect that the
plan administrator always retains the right to amend the plan. See id. at 998; see also
Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 541, 544 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that employer did not
breach duty by failing to notify employees of provision under which employer retained right to amend retirement plan). The commentator proposed that "[b]y
permitting such disclosure, businesses will not be unduly discouraged from adopting or amending early retirement ... plans, and participants' interests can be
adequately protected from material misrepresentations that are intended to induce conduct that is contrary to their interests." See Bintz, supra note 8, at 998.
104. See FischerI, 96 F.3d at 1539 (recognizing employees' need for important
information).
105. See id. ("The warning that a change was under serious consideration
would become meaningless if cried too often.").
106. See id. (discussing limitations on duty to disclose under ERISA).
107. Id.
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Serious Consideration: The Appropriate Formulation

"Serious consideration" forms the crux of the materiality inquiry. 10 8
Serious consideration of a plan change exists when (1) a specific proposal
(2) is being discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to implement the change. 10 9 The test is fact
specific and no single factor is determinative. 10° Similarly, the elements
are not isolated criteria and "the three [elements] interact and coalesce to
form a composite picture of serious consideration." 11 ' One commentator
asserted that conceptually, serious consideration seems to focus on "how"
12
the employer works through the decision-making process.'
108. See id. at 1538 (emphasizing role of serious consideration in materiality
inquiry).
109. See id. at 1539 (outlining elements for serious consideration of plan
change).
110. See id. (declining to adopt bright-line rule); see also Kurz I, 994 F.2d 136,
139 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that serious consideration cannot be tied to single objective event). In Kurz I, the employer argued that the benchmark for measuring
"serious consideration" is when the plan change is formally proposed to the board
of directors for discussion. Id. (citing Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d
1154 (6th Cir. 1988)). The court disagreed, but conceded that such a bright-line
,rule would be easier to administer than the FischerI materiality standard. See id.
Instead, the court noted that unfairness would result in some cases if it linked
"serious consideration" to a single objective event. See id. As an example, the court
cited FischerI, in which the employer had sent a letter to all employees announcing
that an early retirement plan would soon be proposed to the board of directors.
See id. (citing FischerI, 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1993)). This voluntary notification would fail to satisfy serious consideration under the bright-line rule even
though the event suggests that the employer believed that fairness dictated not
only truthful representations to inquiring employees, but also disclosure of the
plan without specific employee inquiry. See id.
111. FischerII, 96 F.3d at 1539. The court explained this proposition: "Consistent with our decision in [Kurz 1], this formulation does not turn on any single
factor; the determination is inherently fact specific. Likewise the factors themselves are not isolated criteria; the three interact and coalesce to form a composite
picture of serious consideration." Id.
112. See Carleen, supra note 3, at 36. This commentator noted that
[i]n theory, "serious consideration" appears to rest on a consideration of "how," not "whether." While an employer works through the preliminary steps of deciding whether to change a plan-in the court's
words, "gathering information, developing strategies, and analyzing options"-it has no fiduciary duty to plan beneficiaries. General "discussion" also triggers no fiduciary duties. However, once an employer begins
its "discussion for implementation"-that is, once "senior management"
begin deciding how they will implement the change-fiduciary duties of
truthfulness arise.
This theoretical distinction between "whether" and "how" is an extremely fine one in practice, however, and more than one employer will
probably get caught on the wrong side of it. In this respect the unwary
employer should understand that the test of Fischer and Kurz is far more
complicated than it seems.
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The first element requires "a specific proposal that is sufficiently concrete to support consideration by senior management for the purpose of
implementation."' 3 This element distinguishes serious consideration
from preliminary phases of information gathering and strategy development.11 4 The specific proposal does not need to be in final form and it
may contain several alternatives and differ somewhat from the plan that
15
the employer ultimately implements.'
The second element of serious consideration requires that the employer discuss the practicalities of implementing the plan change." 6 This
element further distinguishes serious consideration from the preliminary
phases of information gathering and strategy formulation. 117 Moreover,
this factor protects the ability of senior management to participate in the
preliminary phases without triggering a duty of disclosure.1 18 For example, senior management can order an analysis or comparative study of
benefits alternatives without "seriously considering" implementing a plan
change." 9 Likewise, the court characterizes interaction among upperlevel management, company personnel and outside consultants as
20
preliminary.'
113. Fischer I,96 F.3d at 1540. The court considered the consulting firm's
report as "an excellent example of a specific proposal" because "[the] document
outlined various early retirement alternatives and served as a basis for management's deliberations." Id. at 1542.
114. See id. at 1540 ("A company must necessarily go through these preliminary steps before its deliberations can reach the serious stage.").
115. See id. (discussing flexibility of "specific proposal" requirement). One
commentator noted that "[w]hile serious consideration could occur before a proposal is cast in final form, and even when alternatives are on the table, general

review or consideration of principles and philosophies would not meet the standard." Mark R. Hornak et al., Modifying Employee Benefits, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1997,
at C6. Instead, the commentator noted, "[t]here must be a specific proposal that
is concrete enough to support review and deliberation by senior management, not
simply for the purpose of strategizing, but for implementation." Id.
Another commentator expressed that "'a specific proposal"' can include multiple proposals, hence "an employer need not have narrowed its options down to
only one before serious consideration may have begun." Carleen, supra note 3, at
36. The commentator noted that the "specific proposal" in Fischerwas a benefits
consulting firm's report "that outlined various early retirement alternatives." Id.
96 F.3d at 1540 (discussing second element of serious con116. See Fischer II,
sideration and outlining requirements). The court focused on the April 7, 1990
meeting at which senior management with the authority to implement the plan
change was present. See id. at 1542. The court found that "[t]he subject of the
meeting was corporate strategy, and meeting notes indicated that [the president]
disclosed his intent to announce $100 million in cost cuts." Id. Hence, the court
concluded, "[b]oth facts suggest that an early retirement plan was discussed for
purposes of implementation at the April 7 meeting." Id.
117. See id. at 1540 (differentiating serious consideration from preliminary
phases of decision-making process).
118. See id. (noting protective factor of second element).
119. See id.
120. See id. ("These discussions are properly assigned to the preliminary stages
of company deliberations."). One commentator asserted that the second element
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The final element requires that senior management with the authority to implement the plan change consider the proposal.12 1 This element
ensures that the serious consideration inquiry focuses upon "the proper
actors within the corporate hierarchy." 122 Thus, as a general rule, the periodic review of benefits packages in the ordinary course of business and
subsequent recommendations made by those involved in the review pro123
cess will not constitute serious consideration.
Instead, "senior management" is limited to those executives who possess the authority to implement proposed plan changes. 124 This focus on
authority can be used to identify the "proper cadre of senior management," but it should not limit serious consideration to deliberations by the
management body that literally has the power to implement changes in
benefits packages, such as the board of directors.1 25 Rather, it is sufficient
that the plan be considered by those members of senior management with
the responsibility for the "benefits area of the business" and who ultimately make recommendations to the board of directors regarding bene126
fits operations.
is "similarly treacherous" because serious consideration can begin even before the
individuals working on the plan change know whether it will be adopted. See
Carleen, supra note 3, at 36. The commentator noted that the president in Fischer
had announced that he would consider an early retirement plan if the state utilities commission did not approve a rate increase. See id. The commentator observed that:
The rate increase was disapproved on April 19th, but the court held that
"serious consideration" had begun on April 7th ....
Similarly, in [Kurz
I], the court held that serious consideration had begun on the day a vice
president asked the president and CEO to submit a recommendation to
the board. The board, however, did not approve the measure until
nearly a month later.
Id.
The commentator expressed that there may be long periods of time "during
which a court will hold that serious consideration of a plan amendment has begun
but during which even the fiduciaries involved will not know that the amendment
will be adopted." Id. The commentator emphasized that adoption of the plan
amendment may depend on some triggering event initiated by a third party, such
as the PUC's rate increase in Fischer II or the board's approval in Kurz II. See id.
121. See FischerI, 96 F.3d at 1540 (discussing third element of serious consideration formulation).
122. Id.
123. See id. (expressing that "[large corporations] employ individuals ... to
gather information and conduct reviews ....
During the course of their employment, these employees ...

necessarily discuss their duties ....

These discussions

may include issues of implementation.").
124. See id. (defining "senior management").
125. See id. (differentiating between those who have technical power to implement changes in benefits packages-board of directors, for example-and those
who have actual power to implement changes-senior management).
126. See id. (discussing members of senior management qualified to seriously
consider plan changes).
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Serious Consideration:Not a Bright-Line Rule

In FischerII, the Third Circuit emphasized that it was not establishing
a bright-line rule. 127 In fact, the court noted that its approach "contrasts
markedly" with the true bright-line rule adopted by the Second Circuit in
Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp.128 In Pocchia,the Second Circuit adopted a brightline rule establishing that a fiduciary has no duty to voluntarily disclose
plan changes to employees who fail to request information about changes
in benefits before such changes are adopted. 129 Nevertheless, in this re1 30
spect there seems to be no real tension between FischerH and Pocchia.
In Pocchia, the Second Circuit adopted a bright-line rule regarding employees who do not inquire about proposed changes, whereas in Fischer II,
the Third Circuit adopted a fact-specific approach regarding employees
who ask about proposed changes and are answered with
3 1
misrepresentations. 1
127. Id. (declining to adopt bright-line rule with respect to serious consideration formulation). The court declined to articulate a standard of review for addressing the issue of serious consideration, leaving open the determination of
whether this is a question of fact or law. See id. at 1541 n.3.
128. See id. at 1540 (citing Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1996)).
129. See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278. For a discussion of the Pocchia decision, see
supra note 62-64 and accompanying text.
130. See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278 (distinguishing Fischer I because it addressed
breach of fiduciary duty to disclose within context of employees' requests for information, whereas Pocchia involved no such request). The Second Circuit, in dicta,
suggested that had an employee inquired about the early retirement plan, the employer would have had a "fiduciary duty not to make affirmative material misrepresentations or omissions." Id. at 279. Although in a subsequent case, the Second
Circuit expressed that "[w] hether a plan is under serious consideration is but one
factor in the materiality inquiry." See Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F. 3d 117,
123 (2d Cir. 1997).
131. CompareFischer I, 96 F.3d at 1539 ("[Tlhe [serious consideration] determination is inherently fact-specific."), with Pocchia,81 F.3d at 278 (adopting brightline rule "that a fiduciary is not required to voluntarily disclose changes in a benefit plan before they are adopted"). The serious consideration standard has been
accepted by several courts of appeals. See, e.g., Hockett v. Sun Co., Inc., 109 F.3d
1515, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting serious consideration standard with regard to fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA to disclose potential plan changes); Maez
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1995) (same);
Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). Conversely, the serious consideration standard has been rejected, albeit implicitly, by
two courts of appeals. See Porto v. Armco Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting existence of fiduciary duty to disclose beyond compliance with ERISA's
express disclosure rules and, therefore, implicitly rejecting serious consideration
standard); Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It is not a
violation of ERISA to fail to furnish information regarding amendments before
these amendments are put into effect."). Alternatively, the Second Circuit takes a
hybrid approach: if an employee inquires about potential plan changes, the plan
administrator has a "fiduciary duty not to make affirmative material misrepresentations or omissions." Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 279; see Mullins v. Pfizer Inc., 23 F.3d 663,
668-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that plan fiduciary may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants regarding plan changes); see also Bal-
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APPLICATION

FischerII is the paramount decision in the Third Circuit's ERISA fiduciary jurisprudence. Because the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to
hear Fischer II, it seems the "serious consideration" formulation stands as
good law. Hence, the practical significance of FischerIIis twofold. First, it
provides the legal community with a framework for advising employers
within the Third Circuit who are administering their employee benefit
plans and contemplating potential plan changes while responding to employee inquiries about the possibility of such changes. 13 2 Second, FischerII
leaves an unanswered question, namely, whether under the serious consideration analysis an employer has an affirmative duty to volunteer information regarding potential plan changes to employees who fail to inquire
133
about such a possibility.
A.

Advising Employers

Because the Third Circuit's holding in FischerII applies to both denials and failures to disclose, the legal conclusion is that if beneficiaries ask
about potential plan changes, plan fiduciaries must tell them whether the
company is seriously considering plan changes even if the adoption of the
change is still uncertain.13 4 As a practical matter, many employers who
administer their employee benefit plans, in complying with ERISA's requirement that they keep employees informed of all material plan provisions, commonly employ benefits counselors who are responsible for
explaining the benefit plan to employees and answering their questions.13 5 Hence, a significant implication of the Fischer II holding is that
these benefits counselors can bind the employer if they accurately explain
the current benefits plan but fail to disclose potential changes of which
they are not aware.' 3 6 Therefore, it is imperative that practitioners educate their clients within the Third Circuit who administer their employee
lone, 109 F.3d at 123 (reaffirming Mullins). Nevertheless, if the employee does not
inquire about potential plan changes, the plan administrator has no duty to voluntarily disclose information. See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278.
132. For a discussion on advising employers, see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of an issue not answered in Fischer II, whether ERISA
fiduciaries have a duty to disclose information regarding potential plan changes
under serious consideration to employees (or beneficiaries) who have not made
inquiry, see infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
134. See FischerII, 96 F.3d 1533, 1541 (3d Cir. 1996) (involving explicit denials
in response to employees' inquiries regarding information about potential plan
changes), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Kurz II, 96 F.3d 1544 (3d. Cir. 1996)
(involving failures to disclose potential plan changes in response to employees'
inquiries).
135. See Hornak et al., supra note 115, at C6 (postulating implications of imposition of fiduciary duty to disclose upon employer with many benefit plans at
many diverse locations).
136. See id. (concluding that such implication "could bring the business of
plan administration to a complete halt").
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benefit plans that they have an additional burden under Fischer H to instruct these benefits counselors not to answer any questions until they consult with the senior management-the level that seriously considers plan
changes-to ensure that no plan changes are currently under serious
13 7
consideration.
Additionally, the absence of a bright-line rule coupled with the Third
Circuit's adoption of a subjective, multi-factored test reduces the likeli138
Inhood of summary adjudication of the serious consideration issue.
deed, employers must adhere to the principles of clarity and consistency
in communicating with employees regarding their benefit plans so that
employers can avoid costly litigation. Finally, in light of the Taylor holding
that nonfiduciaiy employees can bind plan administrators, it appears that
employers can limit their liability by restricting the number of individuals
39
who are authorized to speak with employees about the benefit plan.'
B.

An Unanswered Question

In the wake of FischerII, an unanswered question remains under the
serious consideration analysis regarding whether an employer has an affirmative duty to volunteer information regarding potential plan changes
137. See id. One commentator advised that
[t]
hose involved in plan administration also must receive specific instruction on how and when to respond to plan participants. Employers
and sponsors must consider the degree to which they have disseminated
information regarding what is contemplated-or, more importantly, what
is not being contemplated-regarding plan changes. Those involved in
the process must be trained to "issue spot" inquiries from participants
and beneficiaries that could trigger disclosure requirements.
Id.
138. See id. (discussing consequences of absence of bright-line rule). One
commentator noted that when viewed in the context of other Third Circuit precedent, the Fischer II approach creates substantial uncertainty for plan administrators.
See id. It seems likely that this commentator was referring to the issue of whether
plan administrators have a duty to disclose plan changes under serious consideration to employees who have not inquired. See id. This issue is left unanswered in
FischerII, though there is language raising the issue in Bixler and Judge Weiner's
district court opinion. See Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., Nos. CIV.A.90-8020,
CIV.A 91-2771, 1995 WL 510300, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1995) (suggesting that
employers may have affirmative duty to disclose information regarding potential
plan changes even when employees do not request such information).
139. See Homak et al., supra note 115, at C6 (discussing ways employers can
limit their liability under ERISA). Additionally, one commentator advised:
Finally, the plan administrator of any benefit program should be
someone other than the employer. As the [Third] Circuit held in Taylor,
the employer-defendant was not liable for its manager's statements because it was neither the plan administrator nor the fiduciary under ERISA, but liability could be triggered if that nonfiduciary employee was
deemed an agent of the plan's administrator. By assuring that authority
is clearly communicated as residing only with the plan administrator, and
not the employer's benefits-related employees, liability, if asserted, may
be limited to the ERISA-regulated plan administrator.
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if employees fail to inquire about such a possibility. Interestingly, when
Fischer I was remanded, the district court, in dicta, expressed that there
might be a duty to disclose prospective plan changes even when the employee
does not ask; thus, a fiduciary may make a material misrepresentation by
remaining silent. 140 In Fischer II, although the Third Circuit did not address this issue, it expressly distinguished its approach from that of the
Second Circuit in Pocchia.1 4 1 Likewise, because Fischer II only dealt with
employees who had asked about plan changes, it remains uncertain how
1 42
the Third Circuit would rule should this corollary issue come before it.
Nevertheless, from a practitioner's perspective, one could claim
breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose under ERISA when confronted
with an affected retiree who assumed no plan changes were in the works
140. See Fischer, 1995 WL 510300, at *2. Indeed, Judge Weiner addressed this
issue explicitly:
We also find that PECO was under an affirmative duty to inform those
who did not ask about a pension plan sweetener in the pre-retirement
interviews. As the court stated in Bixler the fiduciary has an obligation to
convey complete and accurate information, "even if that information
comprises elements about which the beneficiary has not specifically inquired." Accordingly, it is immaterial whether members of the class specifically solicited and were given incorrect information. So long as they
retired after PECO began seriously considering a plan change and were
not informed of this fact, they have prevailed on their claims.
Id. (quoting Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamster Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1300 (3d Cir. 1993)).
141. Fischer I, 96 F.3d 1533, 1540 (3d Cir. 1996) (drawing distinction between
court's approach and approach employed in Pocchia), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247
(1997). For a discussion of this distinction, see supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
142. Fischer II, 96 F.3d at 1540 (failing to address whether employers have
affirmative duty to disclose information regarding potential plan changes when
employees do not request such information). This uncertainty is accentuated
when considering the competing views that surrounded the FischerH holding. One
commentator interpreted Fischer II as standing for the proposition that "only
changes that are being seriously considered must be disclosed to employees when
asked." Early Retirement Plan Guidance Provided by Third Circuit, N.J. EMPLOYMENT L.
LE'TER (Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, Brentwood, Tenn.), Dec. 1996, at 10 (emphasis added). In contrast, another commentator observed that
[a]lthough the Second Circuit sought to distinguish the Third Circuit
decision as one in which disclosure was necessary to alleviate participants'
confusion caused by the fiduciary's prior statements, the Third Circuit
holding could be viewed as imposing an additional affirmative duty to
disclose the existence of a contemplated change to any participant whose
interest might be adversely affected by the fiduciary's silence. Taken together, these decisions raise the prospect of a split in the courts. Until
the issue is resolved, a plan fiduciary's prospects for success when sued on
a "failure to disclose" claim may depend in large part upon where the suit
is filed and whether the issue is implementation of a new program, as in
the Second Circuit decision, or amendment of an existing program, as in
the Third Circuit case.
Courts Diverge on Duty to Disclose Plan Changes Before Adoption, N.J. EMPLOYMENT L.
LETTER (Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, Brentwood, Tenn.), Sept. 1996, at 3.
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and failed to inquire.14 3 Such a claim would not only be consistent with
the foregoing, but it would also be consistent with the Third Circuit's language in Bixler stating that the duty to disclose "entails not only a negative

duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative1 44duty to inform when the
trustee knows that silence might be harmful."
Mathew S. Rotenberg

143. See, e.g., Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300 (expressing that ERISA fiduciary his affirmative duty to disclose information regarding potential plan changes). This is
especially true in light of the fact that the court adamantly distinguished its'approach from that of the Second Circuit. See FischerII, 96 F.3d at 1540.
144. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300. At first glance, it may seem that Bixler stands for
the proposition that an employer has a duty to disclose potential plan changes to
employees who fail to inquire. Nevertheless, factually, Bixler did not involve alleged misrepresentations regarding potential plan changes to an employee benefit
plan, rather, that case involved alleged misrepresentations regarding plan coverage. Id. at 1301-02. With this in mind, it is noteworthy that if the Third Circuit
recognizes a breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose under ERISA when an employer does not disclose potential plan changes to employees who fail to inquire, it
would not be novel. Indeed, such an approach tracks the District of Columbia
Circuit's ruling that "a fiduciary must convey complete and correct material information to a beneficiary." Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747, 750
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Expressing that this duty is not novel, the
court quoted Judge Benjamin Cardozo: "'A beneficiary, about to plunge into a
ruinous course of dealing, may be betrayed by silence as well as by the spoken
word.'" Id. at 751 (quoting Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E.
378, 380 (N.Y. 1918)).
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